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Bank Ownership and Management Structure
Affects on Principal-Agent Costs and
Returning Capital
Joel Wicks, Illinois Wesleyan University
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Abstract

This paper attempts to add to existing research on corporate payout by focusing
on the role that the principal-agent problem plays on dividend policies of public and
private banks. The results indicate that private banks are better able to monitor mangers
use of excessive free cash flow and retaining earnings and will be more willing to let
retained earnings build up without returning them to owners in the form of dividends or
stock repurchases.
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1. Introduction

There have been many studies addressing the topic of companies return of capital
to owners, and there are many competing and complementary theories on this subject!.
This paper focuses on the residual dividend theory that suggests that companies should
retain and reinvest earnings as long as returns on investments exceed the returns
stockholders could obtain on other investments. This paper attempts to add to corporate
payout research by focusing on the role that the principal-agent problem, which is
inherent between managers and owners, plays on corporate payout policies when looked
at through the residual dividend theory. While owners desire to have the greatest return
on their contributed capital, managers often have incentive to grow the firm for the sake
of growth. Famous investor Warren Buffet believes that owners desire the highest rate of
return on their capital, so management should return it to owners if managers are unable
to generate a higher rate of return than owners could obtain if the owners invested the
extra capital elsewhere (Hagstrom, 2004). However, managers have incentives to cause
firms to grow beyond optimal size. First of all, managers desire growth because it
increases their power and the amount of resources they control, which is associated with
higher compensation. Also, growth allows managers an easier way to retain and keep
employees happy by creating a reward system that allows for more promotions because
of the increased supply of positions due to the company's growth (Jensen, 1986).
The problem is very clear with the hypothetical balance sheets of companies had
they chosen not to pay dividends. According to DeAngelo (2004):
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See Allen and Michaely (2002) for an extensive review ofthe prior research
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"had the 25 largest long-standing dividend -paying industrial firms in
2002 not paid dividends, they would have cash holdings of $ 1.8 trillion
(51% of total assets), up from $160 billion (6% of assets), and $ 1.2 trillion
in excess of their collective $600 billion in long term debt. Absent
dividends, these firms would have huge cash balances and little to no
leverage."
All of this excess cash would be available for investment into projects and acquisitions
with no additional investment opportunities. Warren Buffet believes that "just as work
expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak
up available funds." (Hagstrom, 2004). As a result of this excess cash managers likely
would have invested in less profitable opportunities resulting in a decrease in return on
equity. Therefore, in order to minimize the principal-agent problems with managers,
owners usually demand for capital to be returned when they see a buildup in cash from
retained earnings (DeAngelo, 2004).
In order to test the principal-agent problem, this paper will focus on the banking
sector because both private and public banks have to file publicly viewable call reports
with the Federal Reserve Banks. Therefore, the difference between public and private
banks decisions to return capital to owners can be tested. The main difference between
public and private banks is their ownership structure. While public banks tend to have
many shareholders who are disconnected from management, private banks generally have
fewer owners who tend to be more actively engaged in managing or overseeing the banks
management. This study finds that private and public banks do indeed respond
differently to large free cash flow and high retained earnings. Public banks tend to return
more capital as free cash flow and retained earnings increase compared to private banks.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a survey of existing
literature on the role that principal-agent costs play on corporate payout policy, section 3
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describes the data used in this study, section 4 examines the empirical models used to test
the theory laid out in section 3, section 5 discusses the results of the linear regressions
and section 6 concludes the study.
2. Theory / Literature Review

According to Miller, Merton, and Modigliani, (1961) investors should be
indifferent to corporate payout policy when valuing shares as long as the corporation's
investment strategy remains the same. Investors should be indifferent if a company
retains all of its earnings, because if investment remains the same the company will grow
at the same rate and investors can mimic dividends by selling off a portion of their
holdings. However, this line of reasoning doesn't hold up if investment decisions are
affected by payout policy. Harford (1999) found that firms with large cash flows are
more likely to attempt acquisitions and that those acquisitions tend to be value decreasing
compared to companies with smaller cash flows. He notes that this provides strong
evidence of principal-agent problems in cash rich firms and that the market tends to
punish the cash rich firms who distribute little to none of their excessive free cash flow.
This suggests that payout policy can influence investment decisions, so therefore
shareholders shouldn't be indifferent to payout policy.
One way of measuring the principal-agent problem is retained earnings relative to
the size of the company. Another measure is free cash flow, as defined by the amount of
cash a company brings in through its income generating operations in excess of cash that
is required to fund all projects exceed a required rate of return, as a key way to measure
the principal-agent problem between managers and owners. DeAngelo (2004) argues
that, as investors see retained earnings accumulate, they will increasingly pressure
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managers to pay more dividends. Others, including Jensen (1986), tend to focus on the
role free cash flow plays in increasing the principal-agent problem. Owners tend to focus
on retained earnings and free cash flow as a potential problem for overinvestment
because it is not subject to the same market discipline and monitoring that stock issues or
debt is. If companies are reinvesting their funds inefficiently or plan an inefficient use
for funds, it will be reflected in higher prices for capital if companies seek outside
funding. Banks and investors purchasing new shares issued will penalize companies that
are run inefficiently or have plans to invest in unprofitable projects however internally
generated cash and equity carry no interest rate if they are to be reinvested back into the
company. Therefore, earned equity more plausibly gives managers the opportunity to
wastefully overinvest (DeAngelo, 2004).
Many studies on corporate payout polices tend to ignore share repurchases as an
avenue of returning capital. Since 1982 there has been a significant increase in the
number of shares repurchased, which makes using dividends alone less representative of
capital returned to shareholders than it was in the past (Fama, 2000). This increase in
repurchases is largely due to the SEC adopting Rule lOb-18 in 1982, which diminished
the risk of companies coming under investigation for manipulating stock price under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In fact, 1998 was the first year since Rule I Ob-18 in
which cash distributed through stock repurchases actually exceeded cash distributed
through dividends (Allen and Michaely, 2002). In a survey of financial executives, most
executives responded that ideally their companies would rely heavily on share
repurchases to return capital (Brav, 2005). Much of that is due to the fact that volatile
share repurchase plans are more accepted by the market than volatile dividend payments.
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Also, financial executives listed having excess cash or fewer profitable investments
available as two of the main reasons they repurchased shares (Brav, 2005). This lends
evidence that we should be including share repurchases as an additional measure of
returned capital and also that capital is often paid out to avoid overinvesting. A dollar of
dividends should be weighted the same as a dollar of share repurchases because if there
was a significant disadvantage to using one form of capital repayment, no rational
manager would essentially throw money away using an inefficient avenue to return
capital.
Allen and Michaely (2002) note that a weakness in the principal-agent theory of
corporate payout policy is that there is not a strong and clear mechanism for shareholders
to induce managers to payout excessive cash flow and earnings. However, the literature
provides several possible explanations. The most common way for shareholders to
influence managers' policy is to vote with their money by bidding down share prices for
companies which don't properly mitigate their principal-agent problems. This is
effective if managers have significant ownership positions. Harford (1999) found
evidence from market reactions to acquisition attempts that lends evidence that
managerial stock ownership is seen to lessen principal-agent problems. He found that the
more insider ownership there is of a company's stock the more positive the market reacts
to deals announced by that company. Another way to make voting with your money
effective in inducing corporations to return more capital is for companies to have
managers' compensation be in the form of stock options. Penn and Liang (2001) found
that the use of stock options can be effective in mitigating serious principal-agent
problems, but also noted that it also shifted payout from dividends to repurchases because
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holders of stock options do not receive dividends. Voting with the wallet is also effective
if companies desire to obtain more funds in the future from issuing new stock because
then managers will have an incentive to raise the stock price in order to obtain better
financing.
Pozen (1994) focuses on the role that institutional investors play on influencing
payout policy. Managers that have incentives to drive up their stock price, have a strong
incentive to please institutional investors because they are often a strong driving force
behind stock prices. However, the vote with your money approach is significantly less
effective if management is able to finance all of their projects internally. Also,
sometimes institutional investors have strong tax and transaction costs incentives that
lead them to lobby management for changes rather than sell out their position. If
institutional investors choose to hold on to their position, they have several ways to
influence management decisions to return capital. They can utilize, proxy fights for
control, proxy campaigns against management proposals, shareholder resolutions,
informal jawboning, and explanatory letters, each getting progressively cheaper and more
used by institutional investors. Institutional investors can use these ways to directly
influence management's payout policy or they can use their influence on the company's
board of directors (Pozen, 1994).
White (1996) focuses on the role of the board of directors in this principal-agent
problem. The board of directors is supposed to be overseeing management on behalf of
shareholders but often is comprised of members inside of management. Institutional
investors can use their influence to make sure that there are more outsiders part of the
board of directors. Outsiders on the board of directors have significant personal
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incentives to back shareholders interests so they can work on other boards. Also,
shareholders can make use of dividend provisions that tie bonuses to dividend payouts.
A common dividend provision is to limit the bonus pool available for employees and
executives to some factor of dividends paid, or to set it up so that there is a sharp drop in
bonus money available if dividends are cut. These types of dividend clauses are often
found in large companies with slow growth that would likely be able to internally fund
future projects (White, 1996).
In order to test this theory, this paper uses the set up of Cloyd's study in 2005,
where he uses the banking sector to test how differing ownership structures affect
dividend payments. Cloyd (2005) reasons that public and private banks will have varying
degrees of principal-agent problems between managers and stockholders because of their
different ownership structures, which will result in differences in payout policies
between public and private companies. He says that because private banks' owners tend
to be more directly involved in the management or oversight of management, there is less
of a principal-agent problem in private banks than in public banks. Because there is less
of a principal-agent problem, private bank owners will be more willing to let excess
funds pile up with less fear of a renegade manager pursuing growth beyond that which is
beneficial to owners (Cloyd, 2005).
Cloyd (2005) believes that his public versus private principal-agent problem is
comparable to a cross country sample of firm's likelihood to pay out dividends because
typical ownership structure of companies differs from country to country. La Porta
(1999) conducted a study that found that countries with poor shareholder protection were
more likely to have controlling shareholders who either managed the company directly or
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were in a position to closely monitor managers. Whereas, countries with better
shareholder protection laws were more likely to have more owners who were less
involved in the company.

In

a follow up study he found that countries with poor

shareholder protection, where shareholders are more likely to be more involved in
running the company, had a dividend payout ratio lower than in countries with greater
shareholder protection laws (La Porta, 2000). If the true cause of the lower dividend
payout in countries with less shareholder protection is ownership structure and
involvement, then we would expect to also see lower payout ratios among private banks
than public banks because of similar differences in shareholder involvement.
A Fama and French (2000) study on the characteristics of dividend payers shows
that dividend payments are positively related to size, capitalization and profitability
because all of those characteristics increase a company's ability to pay out dividends
(Fama, 2000). Clearly, a company with high earnings is going to be able to pay out more
dividends than a company with no earnings that would likely have to borrow or liquidate
assets in order to pay out dividends. Fama and French also found that dividend payments
are negatively related to growth. Strong growth is a strong indicator that the company
has superior investment opportunities and therefore a strong incentive to reinvest
earnings (Fama, 2000). This can be seen in Buffett's company Berkshire Hathaway
which has yet to pay any dividends because more wealth can be generated on owner's
equity than owners could generate elsewhere if they had some of their capital returned to
them (Hagstrom, 2004).
After reviewing the relevant literature, we are left with a basic marginal cost
benefit graph for retained earned equity. Figure 1 shows the marginal benefit curve as
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being downward sloping because not all investment opportunities are equal and rational
companies will invest in the best opportunities first. There also exists a marginal cost
curve, because there are opportunity costs; each dollar retained could be returned and
earn interest elsewhere. Also reflected in the marginal cost curve, are the costs of
monitoring management to make sure they are using retained funds effectively.
However, private companies' owners are more involved in running a company and
therefore have a lower cost of monitoring managers for any quantity of retained capital
Therefore, the private cost curve will be shifted down from the public cost curve and
ceteris paribus, a private company will retain a higher quantity of its capital. The
assumption in this graph is constant returns to scale for the cost of monitoring additional
funds and therefore a perfectly flat cost curve, however this assumption is not essential to
the hypothesis. The important assumption is that the public cost curve is shifted up from
the private cost curve.
In summary, the literature review and theory section suggest that the amount of
capital returned depends on several factors. A bank's growth, capitalization, size, and
profitability all affect a bank's ability to return capital, while its growth, amount of
previous retained capital, free cash flow and ownership structure, all affect bank
management's desire to return capital. Therefore, if all other factors are kept constant and .
a company found itself at point Z, due to total earnings and cash flow during the quarter,
in Figure 1, owners would desire to be at point Y if it was a private company or point X if
was a public company. Therefore, in order to move to its equilibrium point, a company
would return capital equal to Qz -Qy if it was a private company or Qz-Qx if it was a
public company. With Qz, Qx and Qy being the corresponding amount of capital retained
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related to points Z, X, and Y. Because the marginal benefit curve is downward sloping
and private companies have a lower cost curve, public companies will return more capital
to owners than private companies if all other factors are controlled for.

Figure 1: Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of Retained Funds
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3. Data

This study uses data from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and looks at the call
reports from private and public bank holding companies. By restricting the data set to
only bank holding companies, the effect of principal-agent costs on dividend payouts can
be tested for because of differing ownership structures within the banking industry. Data
is used from all four quarters of 2004 because there was a change in tax law enacted in
2003 that brings the income tax paid on dividends down to the same level as that paid on
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long term capital gains. This minimizes the different tax incentives that companies face
for dividend payments versus retaining capital. Also, the year 2004 was chosen because
it was unaffected by the recent credit crunch, which is likely to greatly influence any
bank study's results because of the extreme circumstances.

4. Empirical Model

The simple linear regression model shown in Table 1 tests whether public and
private banks react differently to potential principal-agent problems. The dependent
variable in the main model is the sum of cash spent on dividends and cash spent on share
repurchases for the quarter divided by total assets. This differs from the Cloyd (2005)
study which focuses on dividends and did not include share repurchases in the dependent
variable. Fama and French (2000) argue that changes in treasury stock, which is common
stock that a company owns in itself, is a good barometer for share repurchases and
reissuance but Allen and Michaely (2002) note that changes in treasury stock can be a
problematic way to measure payout because often companies retire shares when they
repurchase them, which bias the reported amount of repurchases down. Also, using
change in treasury stock runs into other complications. For example, when companies
pay out stock for stock options to executives it usually comes from treasury stock. This
means that by using change in treasury stock as a measure of repurchases a researcher
picks up not only the financing decisions of share repurchases but also the investing
decision in the compensation to executives. Instead Allen and Michaely (2002)
recommend using cash spent on repurchases as shown on the statement of cash flows,
which is what this study does. Model 2 and 3 look at the same independent variables but
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separate out dividends and share repurchases into two dependent variables to see if these
two means of returning capital are used to mitigate principal-agent problems in a similar
way.
The regressions include a dummy variable for ownership, which takes on a value
of 0 if the bank is public and 1 if a bank is private. This variable will catch the
differences between public and private banks' payout policies that are not picked up by
the interaction variables. These interaction variables between ownership structure and
retained earnings divided by total assets, and between ownership structure and free cash
flow are the key variables to focus on in the regressions. They will show whether theory
is correct in predicting a higher payout ratio for public banks compared to private banks.
In theory, the interaction variables will have a negative and significant coefficient for
reasons stated earlier. If indeed, these interaction variables are negative while the
original variable is positive it will lend strong evidence that indeed dividends are paid out
to mitigate principal-agent problems and that private and public companies have differing
princiapal-agent costs. It is unclear whether the dummy variable will have a negative
coefficient or not. It depends on the differences between public and private banks that
are not picked up by the two interaction variables that attempt to address the principal
agent issue. A true measure of free cash flow isn't used but cash from operations scaled
for total assets is a pretty good approximation. Cash from operations less cash spent
investing could have been used and would have better fit the traditional measure of free
cash flow but it is inappropriate to assume that all the companies invested only what was
prudent when this paper is built upon the assumption that managers have incentives to
overinvest. Instead, by scaling operating cash flow by total assets it assumes that free
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cash flow available is a function of total assets. This assumption is appropriate because
depreciation of assets, with the exception of land and goodwill, is required by United
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Depreciation can be used as an
approximation of minimum capital expenditures. Since depreciation is expected to be
some factor of total assets and this factor should be relatively consistent from company to
company because they are all bank holding companies, the scaling of operating cash flow
by total assets normalizes it by bank size and also provides an approximation of free cash
flow. It is not necessary to specify this factor because it would only affect the coefficient
proportionately to the factor and would not influence the significance.
In order to correct for other possible differences in characteristics between public
and private banks that would likely affect the results, some control variables have been
included. To control for liquidity and profitability differences, the models include cash
flow from operations. One would expect this to have a positive effect because increased
liquidity allows banks to pay out dividends without significantly increasing the risk of not
being able to meet short term debts, and increased profitability also allows for more
dividends to be paid out. In order to control for principal-agent problems, retained
earnings over total assets is included. The last control variable in the models is growth.
This study uses percent change in quarterly earnings before taxes and extraordinary items
compared to the previous quarter. It is slightly flawed in that it might be biased because
of seasonal changes, how volatile quarterly earnings are and how short term the measure
of growth is, but it should be an adequate measure of growth. Earnings before taxes and
extraordinary items is included because it should result in a better look at true operations
and smooth out extra variability that can be caused by taxes and extraordinary items. As
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mentioned before, growth should be negatively related to payout because companies
should retain more of their capital if they have better investment opportunities available.
Also, because this study is looking at banks, it is important to include capitalization as a
variable. If banks are struggling to meet the minimum capital reserve requirements, then
they would be foolish to return capital. As a measure of capitalization the paper uses the
bank's tier 1 capital, which is a bank's core capital and includes common stock equity
and retained earnings and divided it by total liabilities. As discussed earlier, theory
predicts a positive coefficient in front of the tier 1 ratio.
Although other studies have included other variables the models in this paper are
limited to the control variables mentioned above. Total assets is not included as a
independent variable because many of the other factors are already scaled for total assets.
Past studies have included lagged dividends because public firms have an aversion to
decreasing dividends. However, lagged dividends introduce a circular logic problem
because then the model is testing current dividend policy based on past dividend policy,
which was based on the same decision currently being tested (DeAngelo, 2004). Also,
previous studies have used cash on hand as a predictor of dividends being paid out, but
cash tends to fluctuate greatly for a variety of reasons that could confound the results.
While large cash balances could be a build up of retained earnings waiting to be paid out,
they could also be the result of a new capital infusion to finance a profitable investment
opportunity in which case they would not be used for returning capital (DeAngelo, 2004).
So in both cases cash increased greatly but it is caused by a factor that is covered in other
control variables. Instead, cash flow is used because that is a better measure of cash
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available to be invested or returned over the entire quarter rather than a glimpse at cash
holdings at the quarterly cutoff date.

Table 1: Empirical Model

Dependent
PAYOUT
DIVPAYOUT
REPPAYOUT

(Cash spent on Dividends + Cash spent on
Repurchases) /Total Assets
(Cash spent on Dividends) /Total Assets
(Cash spent on Repurchases) /Total Assets

Independent
PRIVATE

Public (0) or Private (1)

REITA

Retained Earnings /Total Assets

PRIVATE*REITA

PRIVATE* (Retained Earnings /Total Assets)

FCF

Cash flow from operations/Total Assets

PRIVATE*FCF

PRIVATE * (Cash flow from operations /Total
Assets)

TIER1
02

Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes /
Previous quarters earnings before extraordinary
items and taxes
Total Tier 1 capital /Total Liabilities
Dummy for quarter 2

03

Dummy for quarter 3

04

Dummy for quarter 4

GROWTH

5. Results

Table 2 illustrates differences between public and private companies. Public
companies and private bank holding companies do not pay out significantly different
amount of capital when controlled for total assets. However, all of the factors included in
our regression that are believed to affect payout are significantly different.
As predicted in the theory section, public companies tend to have lower retained
earnings as a percentage of total assets than private companies do. However, this could
be due to factors other than a bank's decision to payout earnings and capital. Private
companies had significantly higher cash flow, which was theorized to lead to higher
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payout ratios. However, growth was significantly higher for private companies which
would lead to private companies paying out less capital. Based on private companies
having higher free cash flow and higher retained earnings, the fact that both public and
private companies have the same payout means that either privates banks' higher growth
must play a large role in the dividend decision or else the build up of equity and free cash
flow affects public and private banks' payout decision quite differently.

Table 2:

Descriptive Statistics
Means
Combined

Public

Private

Significance

PAYOUT

0.0030

0.0030

0.0030

0.725

DIVPAYOUT

0.0026

0.0021

0.0023

0.011

REPPAYOUT

0.0006

0.0009

0.0006

0.000

TA (Millions)

6.3924

14.542

3.0386

RETA
FCF

0.0588
0.0027

0.0465
0.0024

0.0638
0.0028

0.000
0.000
0.002

GROWTH

0.2506

0.1525

0.2916

0.100

TIER1

0.1041

0.1043

0.1041

0.883

The results from the regressions in Table 3 seem to reinforce the assumption that
differing ownership structures in banks affects banks' decisions to return capital. Based
on the results it appears that the principal-agent problem plays a significant role in how
much capital is returned to owners. The adjusted R1\2 for Model 1 is only .240 which
suggests that there is much of banks , payout policies are left unexplained by these models
but, nevertheless, the regressions have meaningful results.
The coefficient for the variable retained earnings divided by total assets has a
significant and positive effect on capital returned. Based on the regression, for every
increase in public bank holding companies' retained earnings equal to 1% of total assets,
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the banks' capital returned increased by .024% of total assets. Also, the coefficient for
the free cash flow variable has a positive and significant coefficient.

Based on the

regression, a $1 increase in cash flow from operations results in a $0.337 increase in
payout. This is consistent with the study by Cloyd (2005), who found that public banks
paid out more dividends as retained earnings increased relative to total assets and with
other studies such as Jensen (1986) that suggest that dividends increase as free cash flow
increases.

Table 3: Regression Results

Model 1, Adj. RA2 =
.240. Sample size
8656

Model 2 Adj.RA2 =
.368, Sample size
8656

Model 3, Adj. RA2 =
.023, Sample size
8656

PAYOUT

DIVPAYOUT

REPPAYOUT

Beta

Beta

Dependent
Beta

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Variable
-3.832E-5

Constant

0.810

0.000

0.162

0.000

0.382

PRIVATE

0.001

0.002

0.000

0.000

8.537E-5

0.527

REITA

0.024

0.000

0.015

0.000

0.009

0.000

-0.015

0.000

-0.011

0.000

-0.004

0.077

0.337

0.000

0.236

0.000

0.100

0.000

PRIVATE*REITA
FCF
PRIVATE*FCF
GROWTH
TIER1
02
03
04

An

-0.033

0.066

0.078

0.000

-0.111

0.000

-6.134E-6

0.654

-2.761E-6

0.754

-3.373E-6

0.745

0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003

0.423
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.002
0.001
0.001
0.002

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000

-0.002
0.000
0.000
0.001

0.000
0.018
0.000
0.000

important finding was that the interaction between retained earnings divided

by total assets and the ownership structure dummy variable had a significant and negative
coefficient. This suggests that, in fact, private banks do have a different cost curve when
it comes to retaining capital. When the interaction variable is taken together with the
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original retained earnings divided by total assets variable, our regression suggests that for
every increase in a private bank holding company's retained earnings equal to 1% of
assets that bank's returned capital only increases by .009% of assets, as compared to
.024% for public banks. The private bank coefficient for RE/TA is seen by adding the
RE/TA coefficient and the coefficient from the interaction variable between RE/TA and
ownership structure. Clearly, the two banks types are experiencing different cost curves
for funds. Past theory suggests that this is due to ownership structure and its effect on the
principal-agent problem between owners and managers. It is not clear based on the
regression above whether the .009% increase is significant; however it is not crucial that
this effect be positive.

Cloyd (2005) found that for private banks there was an

insignificant relationship between dividends and retained earnings as related to total
assets.

An

inverse relationship between returned capital and retained earnings in private

banks would not indicate that there is no principal-agent problem; it would just indicate
that perhaps retained earnings divided by total assets picks up another relationship. The
important thing to see is that the interaction variable is negative and significant.
The fact that the interaction variable between free cash flow and ownership
structure also had a negative and significant coefficient lends even more evidence to the
principal-agent theory on payout. When looked at together with the coefficient for free
cash flow private banks only paid out $0.304 for every $1 increase in free cash flow
compared to public banks who paid out $0.337 for every $1 increase in free cash flow.
While this could possibly have a few different causes it does fit with the principal-agent
prediction.
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In order to look at the aggregate affect of both interaction variables along with the
Private variable I looked at the theoretical case of two average banks. If two average
banks as defined by the combined means from Table 2 are put in the Model 1 :from Table
3 and one is private and the other is public it becomes clear that the graph in Figure 1
holds up to empirical testing. If that average bank were private it would return funds in
the fourth quarter equal to 0.432% of its assets, while if public it would return funds
equal to 0.475% of its assets in the form of dividends or share repurchase.

The

coefficient for PRIVATE would result in private banks returning additional earnings
equal to .000539% of assets while the interaction variable with FCF would reduce capital
returned by .0000896% and the interaction variable would reduce capital returned by
.000873%.

The interaction variables combine to trump the affects of the PRIVATE

result but it appears that the PRIVATE*RE/TA interaction variable is the responsible for
the majority of the difference.
The growth variable has the expected negative coefficient but is not significant.
This is unexpected and doesn't fit with the residual theory of dividends. However, the
insignificance potentially is from the poor measure of growth used in these models. The
growth variable simply looks at quarterly growth, which tends to be more volatile than
looking at a long term growth.

It

can also be biased because of seasonality or other short

term trends or results in the market. When analyzing the average company's earning
growth in the different quarters it is clear that quarterly growth is volatile. In the first
quarter average growth was -.7353 while the second quarter had average company
growth of .9256. The other two quarters fell in-between those two extremes, but it is
clear that such a volatile measure of growth could influence results.
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When looking at the regressions for Model 2 and Model 3 it is interesting to note
that the decision to pay out dividends is significantly different than the decision to return
capital in the form of share repurchases. When it comes to paying dividends it appears
that ownership structures have significantly different views on the build up of retained
earnings as shown by public banks increasing dividends by $0.015 for every dollar
increase in retained earnings, everything else equal, while private banks would only
increase dividends by $0.004 for the same increase in retained earnings. Similarly, public
banks payout $0.009 more capital in the form of repurchases for every $1 increase in
earnings, while private banks would payout only $0.005 more for a similar increase.
Surprisingly, private banks actually pay out more dividends as their free cash flow
increases compared to public banks. This may be due to several reasons including the
increased flexibility of dividends for private banks so they are a more perfect substitute
for repurchases in private banks than public banks or increased liquidity considerations of
individual owners. However, when looking at repurchases, public banks significantly
increase their share repurchases when free cash flow increases, while private banks
actually have a negative coefficient, which is likely insignificant.

Because retained

earnings are a more long term measure and are built up over a period of time while free
cash flow is a temporary quarterly measure, the results from this study seem to suggest
that in order to mitigate principal-agent problems, companies address long term issues
through dividends while mitigating potential short term problems through share
repurchases. This seems to lend additional evidence to Jonathan, Stephens and Weisbach
(2000) who found evidence that dividends were paid out from permanent earnings while
repurchases were paid out from temporary cash flows.
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6. Conclusion

Payout policy is significantly influenced by the principal-agent problem between
managers and agents. Managers have incentives to invest beyond the level that is optimal
for owners. They stand to benefit from growth for the sake of growth while OWners
would like to maximize their return on their capital whether it is from reinvesting the
retained earnings back into the bank or by investing that capital in another opportunity
after banks have returned it. Therefore, as a bank's retained earnings increase and as free
cash flow increases owners will want more capital returned in order to minimize the
possibility of mangers over investing.
However, our study lends evidence that because private banks tend to have more
involved owners there is less of a principal-agent problem inherent in private banks.
Therefore private banks have a different cost curve when it comes to retaining earnings
and will be more willing to let retained earnings build up without returning them to
owners in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Our study tends to confirm that
DeAngelo (2004) was correct in theorizing that dividends are paid out to avoid
overinvesting. It also agrees with both the Cloyd (2005) and the LaPorta (2000) studies
that found that with greater ownership involvement there is less of an incentive to pay out
dividends to avoid overinvestment.
This study has little to no macroeconomic policy implications. However, it does
potentially have some microeconomic implications. If it is assumed that most banks are
behaving rationally, a tougher argument to make these days, then we can make inferences
into whether or not an individual bank is returning capital optimally. A bank that returns
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more capital than is expected might be seen negatively because they are potentially
passing up profitable growth opportunities, while a bank that pays out too little might
also be seen negatively because they might not properly be mitigating potential principal
agent problems.
Future research on this subject could improve the measure of growth used in this
study to something that is a little more long term and less volatile than quarter over
quarter growth. It would also be interesting to include a variable that looks at whether or
not companies issued debt or equity in the quarter or if they do frequently. If companies
are forced to subject themselves to outside monitoring the shareholders might be more
willing to let companies retain funds. However, this could be problematic because if
companies are looking for outside funding they probably don't have funds available to be
returned to owners. Allen and Michaely also pointed out that a measure of corporate
payout is biased if it doesn't include cash paid out to shareholders in merger and
acquisition activities so correcting for that would improve the paper. Another interesting
avenue for future research would look into why companies choose repurchases over
dividends. The two models looking at repurchase and dividend decisions independently
of each other and looking at the how differing ownership structure affected payout
decisions provided interesting results.
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